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EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM AND
THE RELIABILITY OF OUR COGNITIVE FACULTIES
David Silver

Alvin Plantinga has argued that the evolutionary naturalist has a self-undermining set of beliefs. The first premise, the Probability Thesis, states that the
probability that our cognitive faculties are generally reliable given the truth
of evolutionary naturalism is either low or inscrutable. The second premise,
the Defeater Thesis, states that the evolutionary naturalist who is apprised of
the Probability Thesis thereby obtains a defeater for her belief that her cognitive faculties are reliable. Plantinga's argument for the Defeater Thesis is an
argument by analogy. I argue that it is not obviously the case that
Plantinga's analogical argument is successful; and, I point out what needs to
be done before we can judge whether or not the argument is successful.

I. Introduction

Over the last decade Alvin Plantinga has argued that the naturalist (i.e., the
person who rejects the existence of supernatural beings such as God) who
accepts evolutionary theory has a self-underminillg set of beliefs.! My aim
in this paper is to examine a key premise in this argument.
Before looking at the argument let me introduce a few abbreviations. Let
us refer to naturalism as N and to evolutionary theory as E. We will refer to
the conjunction of N and E as 'evolutionary naturalism'. In addition we
will refer to the proposition that our cognitive faculties are reliable as R.
With these abbreviations in hand we can examine the general structure
of Plantinga's argument. The argument begins with the Probability
Thesis which states that the probability that R is true given the truth of N
and E is either low or inscrutable. The case for the Probability Thesis,
briefly, is this: supposing Nand E to be true, we find that human beings
are the product of an undirected evolutionary process. But, so far as we
can tell, the probability that a creature with this sort of provenance would
have generally reliable cognitive faculties is either low or inscrutable. And
thus we must conclude that the probability that our own cognitive faculties
are reliable given N & E is either low or inscrutable. 2
The next step in the argument is the Defeater Thesis. It holds that an
evolutionary naturalist who is apprised of the Probability Thesis has a
defeater for her belief in R; that is, without further information, it is irrational for her to continue to believe that her cognitive faculties are reliable.
The rest of the argument is that (a) this defeater for R is itself undefeatFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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able, and (b) in virtue of having this undefeatable defeater for R the evolutionary naturalist has an undefeatable defeater for all of her beliefs, including her beliefs in N & E. Thus, it is irrational for the evolutionary naturalist
to believe in evolutionary naturalism once she is apprised of the
Probability Thesis, and this shows her position to be self-defeating.
The focus of this paper will be on Plantinga's argument for the Defeater
Thesis. In the argument he presents us with a number of cases containing
agents who are clearly facing a defeater for some of their beliefs. He then
urges us to see the evolutionary naturalist who is apprised of the
Probability Thesis as being in a relevantly similar position and thus facing
a defeater for her belief in R.
I shall argue that it is unclear whether the evolutionary naturalist really
is in a relevantly similar position to the agents in the analogical cases. And,
in so doing, I shall outline what we need to know in order to determine
whether this argument from analogy is ultimately successful.
We shall proceed as follows: first, we shall look at the analogical cases
that Plantinga offers. Next, I will make explicit the general principle which
explains why the agents in these analogical cases are clearly facing a
defeater for some of their beliefs. With this general principle in hand we
can then tum to see whether the evolutionary naturalist who is apprised of
the Probability Thesis is in a relevantly similar position.
As we shall see, this issue turns on whether she is in a position where
she can rationally believe that her belief in R is formed in a warranted fashion, i.e. in accordance with her epistemic design plan. If she is not in a position to rationally believe this then she will be in a relevantly similar position to the agents in the analogical cases and thereby will have a defeater
for her belief in R.
I shall argue, however, that for all that Plantinga says it appears that the
evolutionary naturalist is in a position where she can rationally hold that
her belief in R is produced in a warranted fashion. She can believe this
either on the basis that her belief in R is produced in a basic way (i.e. not on
the basis of any other beliefs) or on the basis that her belief in R is produced
by an inductive inference from other beliefs. If I am right about this then
Plantinga's argument for the Defeater Thesis is at best incomplete. And,
unless it can be shown that the evolutionary naturalist is rationally
debarred from thinking that her belief in R is produced in a warranted
fashion then Plantinga's argument for the Defeater Thesis fails, and thus so
does his larger argument against evolutionary naturalism.

II. The Argument by Analogy for the Defeater Thesis
A. The Analogical Cases
In this section we will examine the analogical cases that Plantinga appeals
to in his argument for the Defeater Thesis:
• The Widget Cases
• The Freudian Theist Cases
• The Space Radio Case
• The Brain-in-a-Vat Case
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The Widget Cases
In the first widget case a visitor to a factory sees an assembly line carrying
apparently red widgets. She is told by the shop superintendent that these
widgets are being irradiated by a variety of red lights which make it possible
to detect otherwise undetectable hairline cracks; the red color of the widgets,
he says, should thus not be taken as an indication of their true color. In fact,
he says, there are relatively few red-colored widgets. 3 (WPF 230)
What should the visitor believe about the color of the widgets in this situation? Relative to all of her evidence, she should take it that the probability that a widget is red given that it looks is red is fairly low. And this fact
gives her a defeater for any belief she forms to the effect that a particular
widget is red.
Consider now the second widget case. In this case, after her encounter
with the superintendent, the visitor is told by a vice-president that the
superintendent is not trustworthy on the matter of the color of the widgets. The visitor, however, does not know whom to trust-the superintendent, or his detractor.
What should the visitor believe about the color of the widgets in this situation? For all that she knows the probability that a widget is red given
that it looks red could be very low; but also, for all that she knows, it could
be high. Plantinga maintains (quite plausibly) that in this situation she
should be agnostic about the deliverances of her visual perception so far as
color detection is concerned; moreover, he maintains that she thus has a
defeater for any color beliefs about particular widgets she obtains by
observing the assembly line.
The Freudian Theist Cases
In the second set of cases a devoted theist reads Freud and thereby
comes to think that her belief in the existence of God is produced by wish
fulfillment. (WPF 229-30) She then considers the probability that wish fulfillment is a reliable belief-forming process. In the first Freudian theist case
she estimates the probability as rather low. In this case, Plantinga contends, the theist has a straightforward undercutting defeater for any belief
she takes to have been produced by wish fulfillment, including her belief
in the existence of God.
In the second version of this example, the theist finds that she simply is
unable to make an estimate of the probability that wish fulfillment is a reliable belief-forming process. For all that she knows it might be a very unreliable process; but, for all that she knows it might be a highly reliable process.
What should the Freudian theist believe about the existence of God in
this case? Given her agnosticism about the reliability of wish fulfillment
Plantinga plausibly maintains that she thus has a defeater for any belief she
takes to be produced by that belief-forming mechanism, including for her
belief in the existence of God.
The Space Radio Case
In the third case you are to imagine that on a space mission to an
unknown planet you find a radio-like device which periodically emits sentences in English only about topics of which you have no knowledge. "A bit
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unduly impressed with your find," Plantinga relates, "you initially form the
opinion that this quasi radio speaks the truth." (WCB 224) Suppose, however, that after a bit of cool reflection you realize that you know nothing at all
about the purpose of the instrument, or who or what constructed it. In this
case, Plantinga says, "the probability that this device is reliable given what
you know about it, is low or inscrutable; and this gives you a defeater for
your initial belief that the instrument indeed speaks the truth." (WCB 237)
Moreover, we might add, there would be a defeater for any belief that you
formed solely in virtue of the pronouncements of the space radio.
The Brain-in-a-Vat Case
In the final case you begin to consider the possibility that you are a brain
in a vat being subjected to various experiments by Alpha Centaurian cognitive scientists in such a way that your cognitive faculties are not reliable.
You think that this is a genuine possibility; however, you cannot make any
estimate of the probability that your faculties are reliable: "as far as you
can tell, the probability could be anywhere between 0 and 1." Plantinga
concludes: "Then too you have a defeater for your natural belief that your
cognitive faculties are reliable. (WCB 238)
B. The Unsubstantiated Source Principle

In each of these cases Plantinga contends (quite rightly, I think) that the
agent in question has a defeater for some of her beliefs. Plantinga then
urges us to see the case of the evolutionary naturalist who is apprised of
the Probability Hypothesis as being in a relevantly similar position-she
too has a defeater for one of her beliefs, and in particular, for her belief that
her cognitive faculties are reliable.
Although it might be true that the evolutionary naturalist is in a relevantly similar position I submit that this is not obviously the case. In order
to tell whether it really is the case we need, at the very least, to uncover the
general principle which explains why the agents in the analogical cases are
clearly facing defeat, and then see how the general principle applies to the
case of the evolutionary naturalist.
Let us then examine the analogical cases in order to find this general
principle. We shall start with the first Freudian theist case. There the theist
realizes that, given all of her evidence, the probability that the cognitive
faculty which produced her belief in God is reliable is rather low. And it is
this belief that provides the defeater for her belief in God. With this in
mind we might propose a general principle called the Low Reliability
(LR) principle of defeat:

(LR) S has a defeater for the belief p if, relative to all of her evidence,
S takes as low the probability that the source of p is reliable.
Principle LR straightforwardly explains why there is a defeater in the first
Freudian theist case. But, a quick inspection will verify that it does not
explain why there is a defeater in any of the other cases. Consider especially the first widget case.
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In that case the visitor is told by the superintendent that the probability
that a widget is red given that it looks red is rather low. What the example
does not stipulate (nor does the example depend on) is that the visitor
actually forms the belief that her perceptual faculties concerning widgets
are unreliable in the circumstances at hand. Thus, principle LR as it currently stands cannot explain why there is a defeater in this case.
But what does explain why there is a such a defeater? One natural suggestion is that the existence of the defeater has something to do with what
the visitor might rationally believe in this case. To flesh this suggestion out,
though, we need to (a) explain which of the requirements of rationality are
relevant in this matter, and (b) explain exactly what kind of rationality is
being invoked here.
In regards to which rational requirements are relevant to explaining the
presence of a defeater, one might be tempted to say that the visitor is rationally required to form the belief that her perceptual faculties concerning
widgets are unreliable; but, this seems to be too demanding a requirement
of rationality: she might with perfect rationality fail to form the belief that
her perceptual faculties are unreliable. However, she may not with perfect
rationality deny that that her color-detecting faculties are unreliable in the
circumstances at hand. And, let me suggest, it is this fact about rationality
that explains why she has a defeater for color beliefs concerning widgets.
In regards to what kind of rationality is being invoked here let us tum to
Plantinga's distinction between internal and external rationality. Roughly
speaking, internal rationality deals with matters" downstream" from experience, and external rationality deals with matters "upstream" from experience. (See pp. 110-112) In the case at hand the relevant irrationality is
downstream from experience and is thus a matter of internal rationality. In
particular, the internal irrationality stems from the fact that in order to be
internally rational an agent's beliefs must have a requisite degree of coherence. (112) As Plantinga notes there is much work to be done concerning
how much coherence is required for internal rationality; however, I take it
that what drives our thought that there is a defeater in the first widget case
is the sense that the visitor would not meet the minimal degree of coherence required for internal rationality if she were to deny that the probability that her color-detecting faculties are reliable in the circumstances at
hand is rather low.
With this discussion in mind let me propose that the following revision
of the Low Reliability principle explains why there is a defeater in the first
widget case:

(LR') S has a defeater for the belief p if, relative to all of her evidence,
S takes as low, or it would be internally irrational for S to deny as
low, the probability that the source of p is reliable. 4
Principle LR', besides being intuitively plausible, successfully explains
why there is a defeater in the first widget case and the first Freudian theist
case. But, it does not help us with the other cases. Consider, for example,
the second Freudian theist case.
There the theist realizes that the probability that the cognitive faculty
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which produced her belief in God is reliable is, for her, inscrutable. And it
is this belief that provides the defeater for her belief in God. This case suggests the need for a cognate to the original LR principle. Let us call this the
Inscrutable Source (IS) principle of defeat:
(IS) S has a defeater for the belief p if, relative to all of her evidence, S
takes as inscrutable the probability that the source of p is reliable.
The IS principle plausibly explains why there is a defeater in the second
theist case. It also works with the brain-in-a-vat case. There you realize
that, given everything you know, the probability that your belief-forming
faculties are reliable is, for you, inscrutable; and, it is this belief that
(according to the IS principle) provides the defeater for any belief, including R, which you take to have been generated by your cognitive faculties.
The IS principle explains why there is a defeater in the second theist case
and in the brain-in-a-vat case; however, it does not explain why there is a
defeater in the two remaining cases (the second widget case and the space
radio case). To see why this is so let us look at the second widget case.
There the visitor to the factory does not know whom to trust-the superintendent or the vice-president-and this gives her a defeater for her color
beliefs about the widgets. What the example does not stipulate, nor does it
depend on, is that the visitor has any beliefs about the reliability of her perceptual faculties; thus, principle IS does not explain why she has a defeater
for her color beliefs concerning the widgets. To explain why there is a such
a defeater we need to revise the IS principle in a way similar to the way we
revised the LR principle. This suggests the following principle:
(IS') S has a defeater for the belief p if, relative to all of her evidence, S
takes as inscrutable, or it would be internally irrational for S to
deny as inscrutable, the probability that the source of p is reliable.
Let us see how IS' deals with the remaining space radio case. There you
realize that you know nothing at all about the purpose of the space radio;
but, the example does not stipulate that you come to any beliefs about the
reliability of the space radio; thus, the original IS principle cannot explain
why you have a defeater for its pronouncements; but, IS' can explain why
there is a defeater. This is because given your cognitive situation-including the fact that you have just come to reflect upon the reliability of the
space radio as well as upon the fact that you know nothing about its origins, purpose or provenance-it is internally irrational for you to deny that
the probability that the space radio is reliable is, for you, inscrutable.
Principle IS' appears then to both be intuitively plausible, and combined
with principle LR' can explain why there is a defeater in each of the analogical cases. Indeed, we may combine IS' and LR' into a single principle
which I call the Unsubstantiated Source (US) principle of defeat:
(US) S has a defeater for the belief p if, relative to all of her evidence,
S takes as low or inscrutable, or it would be internally irrational
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for S to deny as low or inscrutable, the probability that the
source of p is reliable.

It is this US principle, I contend, which explains why the agents in the ana-

logical cases are clearly facing defeat for some of their beliefs.

III. The US principle and the Defeater Thesis
A. What will decide the matter?
In the last section I argued that it is the US principle which explains why the

agents in the analogical cases are clearly facing a defeater for some of their
beliefs. With this principle in hand we can now see how it applies to the
case of the evolutionary naturalist who is apprised of the Probability Thesis.
This issue turns on certain facts about what she might believe about the cognitive faculty which has produced her belief in R, or what we might call her
R-faculty. In particular it depends on whether she believes, or it would be
internally irrational for her to deny that, relative to all of her evidence, the
probability that her R-faculty is reliable is either low or inscrutable.
If any of these disjuncts hold then the US principle shows that she has a
defeater for her belief in R. Note, however, that the Probability Thesis
states merely that relative to her belief in evolutionary naturalism the probability that her cognitive faculties (which certainly include the R-faculty) are
reliable is either low or inscrutable. This is not one of the relevant disjuncts. But, someone might claim, one of the relevant disjuncts follows as a
direct consequence of the evolutionary naturalist's being made aware of
the Probability Thesis. In particular someone might claim that it is internally irrational for the evolutionary naturalist who is apprised of the
Probability Thesis to deny that relative to all of her evidence the probability that her cognitive faculties are reliable is either low or inscrutable.
Why think this is so? Someone might think so on the basis of the following principle concerning the degree of coherence among one's beliefs
that is necessary in order for one to be internally rational:
The Attended No-Reason (ANR) condition: if agent S's attention is
brought to bear on whether her belief B is formed in a warranted
way, and it is internally irrational for her to accept any reason for
thinking that B is warranted, then it is internally irrational for her to
continue to believe B.5
Let us reflect for a moment on the role that attention is playing in this principle. The suggestion here is that the internal rationality of an agent's
acceptance of B may be affected simply by her coming to reflect on
whether B is formed in a warranted way. Before reflecting on this matter it
might be internally rational for her to accept B even though it is not internally rational for her to accept any reason for thinking that B is warranted.
Once her attention is brought to bear on the question of whether B is warranted, though, the ANR principle declares that it is internally irrational for
her to continue to believe B.
The ANR principle has a certain degree of intuitive plausibility. In addi-
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tion, it neatly explains how an evolutionary naturalist is supposed to go
from an awareness of the Probability Thesis to the possession of a defeater
for R: reflection on the Probability Thesis brings the evolutionary naturalist's attention to bear on whether her belief in R is formed in a warranted
way. And, supposing that there simply is no internally rational reason for
the evolutionary naturalist to think that R is formed in a warranted way,
then it turns out that reflection on the Probability Thesis leads the evolutionary naturalist to have a defeater for her belief in R.
It is this appeal to the ANR principle along with the supposition that
there is no internally rational reason for the evolutionary naturalist to
believe that R is formed in a warranted way that I believe drives
Plantinga's case against evolutionary naturalism. I shall accept the ANR
principle. But is the supposition that there is no internally rational reason
for the evolutionary naturalist to believe that R is formed in a warranted
way well-founded? In order to demonstrate this there is some hard work
to do. At the very least it is necessary to examine all likely accounts that
the evolutionary naturalist might offer for thinking that her belief in R was
formed in a warranted way-Leo that her R-faculty is part of her epistemic
design plan. If all such accounts are found to be internally irrational for the
evolutionary naturalist to accept then we can conclude that Plantinga's
analogical argument for the Defeater Thesis is successful; however, if we
find that it is internally rational for the evolutionary nahlralist to believe
that her R-faculty is indeed part of her epistemic design plan then the US
principle will not ground the Defeater Thesis.
In the rest of the paper I will discuss two reasons that the evolutionary
naturalist might offer to support the view that her belief in R is produced
in a warranted fashion. One of these reasons takes it that R is accepted in a
basic way, i.e. it doesn't get its warrant by way of being accepted on the evidential basis of other propositions. The other account takes it that R is
accepted on the basis of inductive inference, and thus not in the basic way.
My aim is to show thatjor all that Plantinga says these reasons are internally rationally acceptable for the evolutionary naturalist. If this is right
then Plantinga's case for the Defeater Thesis is at best incomplete until it is
shown how in they are in fact not internally rationally acceptable.
B. The Maximal Warrant Approach
In this section we will discuss the "Maximal Warrant Approach" that an
evolutionary nahualist might employ in order to show that her belief in R
is warranted. The Maximal Warrant Objection takes it that it can be internally rational for an evolutionary naturalist to think that R gets its warrant
in a basic way, i.e. it doesn't get its warrant by way of being accepted on the
evidential basis of other propositions. Given this fact, it can be internally
rational for the evolutionary naturalist to think that R has so much intrinsic
warrant "that it can't be defeated-Qr at any rate can't be defeated by the
fact that P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable." (ND, p. 16)
Might an internally rational evolutionary naturalist think that her belief
in R has a great deal of warrant because it is produced in a basic way?
Plantinga argues that this is not the case. His argument depends on his
understanding of how it is that an evolutionary naturalist might come to
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think that R is produced in a basic way. The idea is that a belief in R is part
of the human design plan because if an agent doubts R she is thereby headed for epistemic disaster. (ND, p. 53) On this reading R is produced in a
basic way as part of the human design plan; however, since it is not produced by that part of the human design plan that is directly aimed at truth
(but rather at that part of the human design plan which is directly aimed at
the avoidance of epistemic disaster) it has no warrant. (d. WPF, p. 40)
What Plantinga's response shows here is that the Maximal Warrant
Objection is acceptable only if it can be internally rational for an evolutionary naturalist to think that her R-faculty is contained in that part of her
design plan which is aimed directly at the truth. I am not sure if an internally rational evolutionary naturalist could think this after fully thinking
through the issues involved here; indeed, I am rather skeptical. 6 But, for all
that I say here, and more importantly for all that Plantinga says, it could be
internally rational for an evolutionary naturalist to believe this; and, so
long as we have no conclusive reason to think to the contrary, Plantinga's
case against the evolutionary naturalist is at best incomplete.
C. The Inductive Inference Approach
Let us suppose, however, that we could conclusively show that it was
not internally rational for the evolutionary naturalist to think that her belief
in R was warranted because it was produced in a basic way. Even then I
would claim that Plantinga's case against the evolutionary naturalist
would be incomplete. This is because the evolutionary naturalist might
think that her belief in R was formed in a warranted way insofar as it is the
product of an inductive inference.
If an evolutionary naturalist could believe this in an internally rational
fashion then it too would undermine Plantinga's case against evolutionary
naturalism. But can she? She could if she could believe the following in an
internally rational fashion:

(a)
(b)

That her belief in R is produced by a faculty of inductive inference,and
That her faculty of inductive inference is a highly reliable beliefforming mechanism.

Let us see how she might make good on these claims. Consider the following chain of reasoning that she might go through: "I have many beliefs
and while some are undoubtedly false the vast majority are true.
Moreover, all and only these beliefs are the product of my cognitive faculties. So, most of the beliefs generated by my cognitive faculties are true.
And, the best explanation of why most of the beliefs generated by my cognitive faculties are true is that my cognitive faculties are in fact highly reliable. And, making an inference to the best explanation, I am entitled to
believe that my cognitive faculties are highly reliable." According to this
chain of reasoning the evolutionary naturalist believes that the relevant Rfaculty is the faculty of inductive inference.
She continues by demonstrating that this faculty of inductive inference is
itself highly reliable. She also demonstrates this via an inductive inference:
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"I have had many beliefs generated by inductive inference. And, it turns out
that the vast majority of these beliefs are true. The best explanation of why
this is so is that I have a reliable faculty of inductive inference. And, making
an inference to the best explanation, I am entitled to believe that my faculty
of inductive inference is highly reliable." Using this form of reasoning the
evolutionary naturalist comes to the belief that she has a highly reliable faculty of inductive inference, and thus that she has a highly reliable R-faculty.
D. Plantinga's Reply: a second argument by analogy
One might object to this appeal to inductive inference on the part of the
evolutionary naturalist. Indeed, Plantinga anticipates this line of argument
and states that:
This argument ought to meet with less than universal acclaim. The
friend of N & E does no better, arguing in this way, than the theist
who argues that wish fulfillment must be a reliable belief-producing
mechanism by running a similar argument with respect to the beliefs
he holds that he thinks are produced by wish fulfillment. He does no
better than the widget observer who, by virtue of a similar argument,
continues to believe that those widgets are red, even after having been
told by the building superintendent that they are irradiated by red
light. Clearly this is not the method of true philosophy. (WPF 233)
As we see here, Plantinga's argument against the evolutionary naturalist's
use of inductive inference is also by analogy. He first points out that it is
illegitimate for the Freudian theist to make use of inductive inference in
defense of the reliability of her wish-fulfillment faculty, and that it is illegitimate for the widget factory visitor to make use of inductive inference in
defense of the reliability of her color-detecting faculties.
Although Plantinga does not make clear which of the two Freudian theist cases, or which of the two widget cases he has in mind, let us agree that
it would be illegitimate in each of these cases for the theist or the factory
visitor to use inductive inference in the way that I suggested on behalf of
the evolutionary naturalist. Consider, for example, the first widget case.
In that case the factory visitor forms color beliefs about widgets on the
basis of her color-detecting faculties; but, given what the shop superintendent has told her it is internally irrational for her to deny that the probability these faculties are reliable in the circumstances at hand is rather low. In
this case it is illegitimate for the visitor to reason as follows: "I have many
color beliefs about widgets, and while some are undoubtedly false the vast
majority are true. The best explanation of why my color beliefs about widgets are true is that my color-detecting faculties are reliable in the circumstances at hand. Thus, making an inference to the best explanation, I am
entitled to believe that my color-detecting faculties are reliable in the circumstances at hand."
I agree with Plantinga that it is illegitimate for the widget factory visitor
to reason in this fashion. I also agree that it is similarly illegitimate for the
agents in the second widget case, as well as in both of the Freudian theist
cases to argue for the reliability of their respective faculties in this fashion.
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But is the evolutionary naturalist in a relevantly similar position? If she is,
then she is debarred from making use of inductive inference in defense of
her belief in R, as well as in defense of her belief that her faculty of inductive inference is highly reliable.
But, I contend, it is far from obvious that the evolutionary naturalist is in
a relevantly similar position to the Freudian theists and the widget factory
visitors. And, I submit, in order to tell whether this is the case we need
first to articulate the general principle which explains why it is illegitimate
for the Freudian theists and the widget factory visitors to make use of
inductive inference arguments in order to argue that their respective faculties are reliable. Once we extract this general principle we can then see
whether it applies to the evolutionary naturalist.
So, what is this general principle? One might think that they are
debarred from making use of such arguments simply because such arguments are epistemically circular. Following Alston, we take an epistemically circular argument to be one that "involves a commitment to the conclusion as a presupposition of our supposing ourselves to be justified in
holding the premises." (15)
Let's consider an example. In the first widget case the factory visitor uses
inductive inference to conclude that her color-detecting faculties are reliable
in the circumstances at hand; however, the premises of the inductive inference argument that she gives can only be seen as true if she presupposes
that these color-d.etecting faculties are in fact reliable in the circumstances at
hand; thus, the argument clearly counts as epistemically circular.
The evolutionary naturalist's use of inductive inference in favor of the
reliability of her various cognitive faculties is similarly epistemically circular. (see p. 119) Her argument is epistemically circular in that she must
commit to R as a presupposition of taking herself to be justified in holding
the beliefs which serve as the basis of the inductive inference for R. And,
her argument that inductive inference is a reliable means of forming beliefs
is similarly epistemically circular.
Given this discussion one might be tempted to say that the evolutionary
naturalist is in a relevantly similar position to the Freudian theist and the
widget factory visitor since they all engage in epistemically circular arguments for their respective faculties? However, someone might object that
there is a relevant difference between the epistemically circular arguments
that the Freudian theist and the widget factory visitor engage in and the circular argument that the evolutionary naturalist engages in. And, the objector continues, the epistemically circular arguments of the Freudian theist
and the widget factory visitor are epistemically objectionable in a way that
the epistemically circular argument of the evolutionary naturalist is not.
For example, someone might think that the epistemically circular arguments of the Freudian theist and the widget factory visitor are unacceptable not merely because they are epistemically circular but rather because
the US principle unambiguously shows that there is a defeater in these
cases. It is the presence of these defeaters which explains why the
Freudian theists' and the widget factory visitors' use of epistemically circular arguments is unacceptable. Indeed, one might put the general point in
this way:
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An epistemically circular argument for belief B is epistemically unacceptable if B already faces a defeater; however, the epistemic circularity of an argument for B is not necessarily a problem if B does not
already face a defeater.8
Although I think that this principle is true, it is beyond the scope of this
paper to argue for it. What is important for our purposes here is that if
someone can believe in an internally rational fashion that it is valid, then she
might rationally believe that her belief in R is warranted due to its being produced by a highly reliable faculty of inductive inference. This is because
while an inductive argument for R might necessarily be epistemically circular, it is far from obvious that this kind of epistemic circularity is illegitimate.
The point here is that it is unclear whether Plantinga's second argument
by analogy successfully rules out the evolutionary naturalist's appeal to
inductive inference. And, since this is true it is also unclear whether his
first argument by analogy in favor of the Defeater Thesis is successful since
it depends on the success of the second analogy. Finally, this leaves it
unclear whether the Defeater Thesis can play its intended role in
Plantinga's main argument against evolutionary naturalism.
Let me conclude, then, by emphasizing what must be shown before we
can conclude that Plantinga's analogical argument for the Defeater Thesis
is successful. First, we must show that the evolutionary naturalist cannot
believe in an internally rational fashion that her belief in R is warranted
due to its being produced in a basic way. Second, we must show that the
evolutionary naturalist cannot believe in an internally rational fashion that
her belief in R is warranted due to its being produced via a highly reliable
faculty of inductive inference. But, again, we have yet to do either of these;
and, until we have, Plantinga's argument against evolutionary naturalism
will remain, at best, incomplete.9
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NOTES
1. See Plantinga's Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford 1993. (WPF),
Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford 2000. (WCB), "Naturalism Defeated", unpublished manuscript. (ND).
2. The Probability Thesis has received a fair bit of attention in the literature. See, for example Evan Fales' "Plantinga's Case Against Naturalistic
Epistemology", Philosophy of Science, 63 (3), September 1996, pp. 432-51; and,
Fitelson and Sober's "Plantinga's Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary
Naturalism", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998), pp. 115-29.
3. This example is due to John Pollock in his Contemporary Theories of
Knowledge, Rowman Littlefield: 1986.
4. Principle LR' identifies that there is a defeater, but does not identify what
it is. According to Plantinga's definition of a defeater, a defeater must always be
a belief (or perhaps some other epistemic state?). (WeB 363) In the case at hand
it would be consistent with Plantinga's definition to say that the defeater was the
belief that the superintendent had said that her color detecting faculties were
unreliable and that she did not know whether or not to trust him on this matter.
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5. This is a more general statement of a principle that Plantinga offers
(although not in this exact form): If agent S believes that one of her beliefs B
requires reasons if it is to be accepted rationally, and believes that she has no
reasons to accept B, then she has a defeater for her belief B. (see ND 28)
6. For a defense of this view, however, see Michael Bergmann's
"Commonsense Naturalism", in Beilby & Peressini's Naturalism Defeated?
Essays On Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, Cornell
University Press, forthcoming.
7. Alston rejects epistemically circular arguments (see pp. 15-16 in his The
Reliability of Sense Perception, Cornell 1993) and acknowledges the skeptical
implications this rejection carries. We can at best, he says, find practical reasons
for believing our basic faculties to be justified; we cannot, however, find epistemic reasons for believing that this is so. See p. 133.
8. A better way of putting this point would be this: "An epistemically circular argument for belief B is epistemically unacceptable if B already faces a
potential or actual defeater; however, the epistemic circularity of an argument
for B is not a problem if B does not already face a potential or actual defeater."
To understand the distinction between potential and actual defeaters see WCB,
p.360. Up to this point whenever I have spoken of a 'defeater' I meant to refer
to an actual defeater.
9. I am grateful to my colleagues Fred Adams, Jeffrey Jordan, Joel Pust
and Michael Rea for helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like to
thank an anonymous referee of this journal for helping me to improve the
paper. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Alvin Plantinga. I
know him almost exclusively from his written work; I nonetheless view him as
my teacher.

